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Psychotherapy and the Problems 
of Values 
John T. Dulin, Ph.D. 
Whether one considers ther-
apy as a healing process or as a 
learning process, the issue of val-
ues soon emerges as a significant 
factor in the therapeutic interac-
tion. Prior to the last decade, 
however, little attention was 
given to the issue of values in any 
form of therapy. Charlotte Buhler 
was one of the few to focus on the 
problem and to acknowledge the 
fact of values in psychotherapy.l 
Although I will be discussing the 
issue in the context of psycho-
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therapy, the general principles 
apply in other forms of therapy 
as well. The purpose of this paper 
is to explore, in a preliminary 
way, the values of the therapist 
insofar as they enter into the 
therapeutic process. 
One might ask at the outset: If 
this issue of values is so import-
ant, how did it happen to be neg-
lected for so long a period of 
time? I would suggest that the 
neglect of values in therapy has 
been due largely to Freud. His 
great influence on the develop-
ment of psychotherapy and his 
lack of attention to his own value 
system seem to be the major fac-
tors in perpetuating the myth of 
a value-free psychotherapy, al-
though one cannot overlook psy-
chology's conscious attempt to 
align itself with the empirical sci-
ences of the nineteenth century 
and reject any semblance of phil-
osophy. In the area of psycho-
therapy, at least, the pendulum 
has swung to the opposite ex-
treme, with a person like Breggin 
speaking of psychotherapy as 
"applied ethics."2 This should not 
surprise us, however, when we 
look at the contributions of Erik-
son, Szasz, and others. Increas-
ingly we are reminded of the fact 
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that the human encounter which 
we call psychotherapy involves 
not only the professional training 
of the therapist but also his per-
sonality, convictions, and values. 
What he thinks or feels about 
fundamental life values will in-
evitably be communicated to the 
patient, especially in view of the 
fact that psychotherapy often in-
volves some modification of the 
patient's attitudes and value. In 
a recent presidential address to 
the Canadian Psychiatric Associ-
ation , Dr. Malcolm Beck ac-
knowledged his fundamental 
Christian orientation and stated 
that this was the only base from 
which he had license to speak. In 
a series of pointed questions he 
went on to ask: 
Can we. in fact. fully relate to 
man as he is, including ourselves. 
without accepting that man is as 
much a product of his personal 
value system as of his libidinal 
forces. and vice·versa: that he is 
free as well as bound. determining 
as well as determined. p03sessing 
free choice as well as conditioned: 
tha t he is responsible as well as re-
sponsive. a maker of history as well 
as being molded hy history ; and 
that he is a being who"" moral and 
re ligious strivings are as real as his 
sexual and aggressive drives?3 
Dr. Beck is obviously aware of 
the assumptive values operating 
in his therapeutic work, and yet 
he does not indicate how he ar-
rived at this point of awareness. 
I would assume that he worked 
out his value frame of reference, 
in much the same way as the rest 
of us, on our own, independently 
of our professional training. It is 
true we were helped both through 
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formal classes and through super-
vision to develop our diagnostic 
skills, treatment prosedures and 
a frame of reference to interpret 
various kinds of behavior. But we 
were left largely to our own de-
vices when it came to the Issue 
of values. 
Personal Values 
We all tend to assume that 
reality is as we perceive it, that 
the values we choose are good, 
not only for us but for all men. 
Yet a therapist as a person has 
been influenced like every other 
person by his parents, his peer 
group, his church, and the society 
in which he lives. His attitudes 
and values have been developed 
over the years through interac-
tion with these environmental 
forces. In the process of develop-
ing our personal value system we 
assess values proposed by others 
in terms of our own needs and 
goals and beliefs. We accept cer-
tain values and integrate them 
into our frame of reference. Oth-
ers we reject as incompatible 
with our frame of reference, and 
still others we modify to fit into 
our system. 
Psychotherapy, as I understand 
it, is essentially an interperson-
al relationship involving mutual 
communication between therapist 
and patient with the purpose of 
helping the patient function more 
adequately. The therapist is one 
whose function is to help or heal 
on the basis of his professional 
training and skills. The patient is 
one who is hurting and comes to 
the therapist for help. We assume 
that pain whether physical or 
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psychological is a sign of malfunc-
tioning. Psychological pain may 
be experienced in the form of an-
xiety, depression, or guilt. It may 
be experienced in the form of dis-
torted perception, bizarre idea-
tion, violent mood swings, or feel-
ings of unreality. 
The patient communicates to 
the therapist his experience of 
pain and the therapist draws up-
on his training and experience to 
diagnose the symptoms and to 
initiate curative measures. If the 
treatment plan is acceptable to 
the patient, the therapist and the 
patient formulate a mutually ac-
ceptable "contract," including not 
only the goals of therapy but 
also the means of reaching these 
goals. This is where the assump-
tive values of both patient and 
therapist come to the fore. If 
what the patient wants or ex-
pects is unrealistic or unaccept-
able to the therapist or vice-versa, 
and if the divergence cannot be 
resolved sufficiently to enable 
them to establish a contract, then 
they cannot work together. 
Freud, for example, despite his 
neglect of the issue of values, is 
quite clear in specifying values 
when he describes the formation 
of the analytic pact or contract: 
Our plan <of cure is based upon 
these views: The ego has been 
weakened by the internal conflict; 
we must come to its aid. The posi· 
tion is like a civil war which can 
only be decided with the help of an 
ally from without. The analytical 
physician and the weakened ego of 
the patient, basing themselves upon 
the real external world, are to com· 
bine against the enemies, the in-
stinctual demands of the id and the 
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moral demands of the super-ego. 
We form a pact with each other. 
The patient's sick ego promises us 
the m03t complete candor, promises 
that is, to put at our disposal all 
the material which his self percep-
tion provides; we on the other hand, 
assure him the strictest discretion 
and put at his service our experi-
ence in interpreting material that 
has been influenced by the uncon-
scious. Our knowledge shall com-
pensate for his ignorance and shall 
give his ego once more maste ry over 
the lost province of his m ental life. 
This pact constitutes the analytic 
situation.· 
More briefly he says, "We con-
clude our pact then with the neu-
rotics: complete candor on one 
side, strict discretion on the oth-
er.".' The fundamental rule is the 
heart of analytic psychotherapy. 
The patient ought to say every-
thing that occurs to him and the 
therapist ought not to take ad-
vantage of this cahdor. I am not 
necessarily disputing this rule, 
especially with regard to the neu-
rotic population with whom 
Freud chose to work. What I am 
concerned about in Freud and in 
others is the lack of investigation 
of the values operative in a given 
therapeutic situation and the va-
lidity of these values. We know 
from experience in therapy that 
the patient very quickly picks up 
the therapist's unexplored bias 
toward one or the other issue, and 
this is certain in some way to in-
fluence the patient. The patient 
will soon pick up what the thera-
pist holds on matters of sex, mar-
riage, religion, divorce, work and 
general life style. In particular, he 
will pick up conflict or discrep-
ancy between what the therapist 
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says and what he feels, between 
the conscious and the uncon-
scious assumptive values. What 
the therapist feels is often con-
veyed by non-verbal cues, and 
what comes across to the patient 
is a double message. The thera-
pist may encourage freedom of 
expression but at the same time 
transmit cues which contraindi-
cate his statements. 
Assumptive Values 
Let us examine for a moment a 
basic value in therapy which 
has definite ethical implications, 
namely, to live is better than to 
die. This value has widespread 
acceptance by society and under-
lies all therapeutic work. But let 
us ask a few questions and pose 
a problem. Is this value absolute? 
Are there no exceptions? What is 
the basis in nature for such a 
proposition? For the human, is 
"to live" restricted to the life 
span of existence within the 
space-time categories known to 
us? And further, granted that the 
proposition is valid for us, do we 
have the right as therapists to im-
pose this value on a patient who 
calmly and deliberately chooses 
to die? We have all had depressed 
patients who saw no purpose in 
continuing to live, who see no 
meaning in life. What did we do? 
Recommend or use electro-shock 
treatment? Confine the patient 
to the hospital until we have suc-
ceeded by whatever means in in-
ducing a will to live? Do we have 
the right to impose this value on 
another human being who does 
not accept it? Szasz for one, opts 
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for absolute autonorriy, meaning 
man's right and capacity to take 
responsibility for himself. Con-
sequently if a man chooses sui-
cide, that is his right and the 
therapist must respect this choice. 
In an address delivered last 
year, Dr. Viktor Frankl used an 
example of a woman who called 
at 3:00 in the morning to inform 
him of her intent to commit sui-
cide. Frankl's reaction, which 
would be that of the majority of 
us, was to spend over a half hour 
trying to convince her by every 
argument at his disposal that she 
should not go through with her 
plan. After exhausting all of his 
arguments, he discovered that the 
woman was willing to change her 
plan and come into his office the 
next morning. Somewhat to his 
chagrin, he also discovered that it 
was not the arguments which con-
vinced the woman to defer her 
suicidal plan, but rather the fact 
that he, as a fellow human being, 
was willing at that hour of the 
morning to spend more than a 
half hour of his time listening to 
her and trying to convince her to 
defer her plan.6 
In a somewhat similar case, 
though using more devious means, 
I was contacted in the early hours 
of the morning by a patient who 
announced to me that he intended 
to commit suicide. I asked him 
how he planned to do it. He an-
swered, "By jumping from the 
window of my apartment build-
ing." I paused and then respond-
ed, "Well, if you are going to 
commit suicide you should at 
least feel half way human when 
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you do it. So do this: make your-
self a pot of coffee, have a ciga-
rette, walk around the block and 
then jump." He agreed and pro-
ceeded to hang up. In analyzing 
my response to this patient, who 
was not only given to intense, 
severe periods of c.iepression, but 
also was markedly impulsive, I 
realized that I was stalling for 
time. A pot of coffee and a ciga-
rette or two would take at least 
20 to 25 minutes. It would take 
him another five minutes to get 
out of his building, perhaps 10 or 
15 minutes to walk around the 
block. It was a calculated risk, 
but I thought that the stall for 
time and the fact that he would 
be going outside would serve to 
change his mind. There seems to 
be something about being alone, 
in the silence of the early morning 
hours, inside, which serves to in-
duce or intensify depression. 
There is something about the 
openness of the out-of-doors that 
seems to help in lifting the de-
pression, in instilling new hope, a 
new desire to live. Two sleepless 
hours later the phone rang again. 
It was the patient thanking me 
for saving his life. 
Another illustration of an as-
sumptive value in therapy: my 
perceptual reality is normal and 
any significant deviation is ab-
normal. Consequently, a goal in 
therapy is to bring the patient to 
relinquish his abnormal reality 
and to accept mine. For example, 
a patient was referred in from the 
medical service because she in-
sisted that a cure be provided for 
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her companion. The difficulty was 
that the resident could not see 
this companion and could not ap-
preciate the patient's upset when 
the companion's leg was caught in 
the elevator door. The companion 
was described by the patient as 
a lifesize monster covered by long 
glossy hair, a kind of "later day 
Harvey," although not a drinking 
companion. This companion ap-
peared whenever the patient was 
under stress and was there to lis-
ten whenever the patient felt the 
need to talk to someone. My im-
mediate task as I saw it was to 
determine whether this object 
was threatening or frightening in 
any way to the patient. Was this 
object a reification of the patient's 
unacceptable or uncontrollable 
impulses? Was it a companion in 
loneliness? Was it good or bad for 
the patient to have such a being? 
After careful examination I con-
cluded that this being was in fact, 
a companion, that it was good for 
the patient, and even though its 
presence did not conform to my 
reality I felt that it would be bad 
for the patient to attempt to re-
move this being. I felt it would 
be bad for the patient to force 
her by whatever means to con-
form to my reality and so I de-
cided to let her keep her monster. 
After all it was no problem to 
provide ·an extra chair for the in-
terview. 
Take another basic value in 
therapy: To be well is better than 
to be ill. We assume that a pa-
tient corning to a therapist for 
alleviation of pain is necessarily 
subscribing to this value. Other-
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wise he would not seek out a 
therapist. But the patient's defi-
nition of well-being may be di-
vergent from the therapist's. For 
example, the experience of severe 
anxiety reactions may be painful 
enough to bring an individual to 
seek therapy. He wants relief 
from the symptom but he may 
not want to relinquish the ap-
parent cause, which may be any-
thing from unrealistic academic 
goals to a homosexual life pat-
tern. I say "apparent cause," be-
cause what appears to be an im-
mediate behavioral cause fre-
quently is only another symptom 
of a deeper cause. The stand that 
the therapist takes depends ba-
sically on his assumptive values. 
An achievement oriented thera-
pist may focus on the emotional 
conflicts which are interfering 
with academic goals, while at the 
same time supporting the aca-
demic goals, whereas one who 
places less value on academic 
achievement may support a modi-
fication of these goals. Similarly, 
the sexually-permissive therapist 
may tolerate or even encourage a 
homosexual life pattern and focus 
on other factors in an effort to al-
leviate the anxiety, whereas a 
sexually-restrictive therapist will 
more likely work toward control 
and/ or sublimation of the homo-
sexual impulses. Examples such as 
these point to and illustrate the 
fact that assumptive values are 
involved in every aspect of psy-
chotherapeutic interaction. 
Therapeutic Interaction 
This brings us to the question: 
on what grounds does the thera-
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pist take his stand? Well-being 
implies a norm, a norm which is 
the basis for judgements of good 
and bad. To a certain extent that 
norm is formulated in terms of 
the therapist's professional train-
ing and experience but more bas-
ic, in my opinion, is the thera-
pist's own value system. I see this 
as more basic because in time it 
comes before his professional 
training, and the experience in-
take during his years of training 
is both filtered and modified by 
his existing assumptive system. 
To an extent we all perceive what 
we expect or want or need to per-
ceive. This holds for the broadest 
ranges of reality as well as for the 
therapeutic interaction. Our for-
mulations of criteria in psycho-
therapy are inevitably subjective 
and we cannot divest them of 
their subjectivity, but we can 
clarify these criteria by making 
them explicit, by questioning 
them and by questioning our-
selves with regards to them. For 
example, do we define well-being 
in terms of the absence of mani-
fest pathology? If so, what is our 
criterion for pathology? Is it so-
cial consensus or is it the nature 
of the organism? Going back to 
Aristotle in his Nichomachaen 
Ethics, we find a definitely teleo-
logical frame of reference. An ac-
tion is said to be good when it is 
in accord with right reason and 
conducive to man's end, which is 
defined as happiness. It may be 
my bias, but I find this concept 
somewhat too culture-bound as 
well as too vague for application 
in a clinical situation. Further, I 
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would agree with Frankl that 
happiness is not an end in itself 
but rather a by-product of living, 
of striving for goals, of searching 
for meaning and fulfillment in life. 
I would propose that every or-
ganism, including the human, 
functions on the basis of a blue-
print of natural law. This law dic-
tates what the organism needs 
for optimal growth. A plant, for 
example, needs certain biochemi-
cal combinations supplied by 
earth, sun, air, and water. As we 
move up to the phylogenetic scale, 
the needs become more complex 
as the organism becomes more 
complex, but on each level we 
find an analagous blueprint or 
natural law. It is this law, ulti-
mately, which provides the defi-
nition of well-being as the criteria 
for psychotherapy. Though the 
point is rarely made explicit, 
training in psychotherapy is in-
tended to develop a deeper and 
more extensive knowledge of the 
natural law operative on the hu-
man level. Because of his profes-
sional training and experience, the 
therapist is presumed not only to 
understand the law better than 
the patient but also, with his un-
derstanding, to help the patient 
lead a healthier and more adap-
tive life, which results in a sense 
of happiness. 
Consequently, the therapeutic 
process involves a modification of 
the patient's values in the direc-
tion of the therapists assumptive 
world. This fact places a respon-
sibility on the therapist not only 
to clarify his own assumptive 
values but also to ground them in 
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the nature of the organism. His 
own needs and beliefs and preju-
dices will inevitably enter to blur 
the picture but at least he will 
have a workable basis for evalua-
tion. As Teilhard de Chardin has 
said, "man is that being who not 
only knows but knows that he 
knows."7 Because man can ask: 
Who am I? Where am I going? 
Why?, he has the task, the re-
sponsibility of finding the an-
swers to these questions. The 
therapist's function as I see it is 
to help the patient in a search for 
these answers and he will be ef-
fective in providing this help, in 
fulfilling his therapeutic respon-
sibility, to the extent that he has 
in some way arrived at these an-
swers himself. 
In conclusion, I hope that this 
exploration of the problem of 
values in psychotherapy may 
serve to stimulate your thinking 
and provide you with further in-
centive not only to evaluate your 
assumptive system but to help re-
solve some of the illusive ethical 
problems in psychotherapy. 
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